




Neural mechanisms underlying voluntary 


































































































































































































































































Chapter 4. Transcranial direct current stimulation over left angular gyrus 





















Chapter 5. Endogenous action selection processes in dorsolateral prefrontal 
































































































































































































1.2. What is volition? 


















































































































































































1.3. Brain circuits for voluntary action 








































































































































































































































































































































































































1.5. What is the function of agency?  





























1.6. What is the content of agency? 









































































































1.7. How sense of agency is measured? 


























































1.8. What is the mechanism of agency? 































































































Transcranial  direct  current  stimulation  (tDCS)  is  an  emerging  form  of  non-invasive  brain 
stimulation  that  delivers  weak  current  to  the  brain  through  a  set  of  two  electrodes.  By 
inducing  intracerebral direct current flow,  tDCS is able  to modify  the neuronal excitability of 
the  targeted  brain  region  depending  on  the  type  of  stimulation  by  a  mechanism  similar  to 
long-term  potentiation  (LTP)  and  long-term  depression  (LTD)  (Stagg  and  Nitsche,  2011). 
While anodal stimulation  increases  the excitability of  the motor cortex, cathodal stimulation 
decreases it (Nitsche et al., 2008a; Reis and Fritsch, 2011). In comparison to TMS, tDCS is 
cheaper,  more  portable,  and  easier  to  apply.  Importantly,  its  capacity  to  provide  polarity 
specific brain modulation without  causing action potentials,  distinguishes  it  from other non-
















voluntary  actions,  rather  than  the  traditional mean  activity.  This  approach  captures,  for  the 
first  time,  the  key  contrast  between  volition  as  a  specific  causal  process  in  the  brain,  vs. 
volition as a random process reflecting “neural noise”. 
Chapter  3  investigates  whether  experience  of  voluntary  action  could  be  a  reconstructive 
inference  triggered  by  monitoring  one’s  actions  and  their  outcomes,  or  a  read-out  of  brain 
processes related to action preparation, or some hybrid of these. We test this question in a 
group of healthy participants and in a patient with anarchic hand syndrome. 
Chapters  4  and  5  aims  to  understand  the  mechanism  of  sense  of  agency  by  modulating 
brain  circuits  involved  in  control  of  action,  while  measuring  stimulation-induced  changes  in 





In  chapter  6,  by  pairing  voluntary  actions  of  one  hand  with  involuntary  movements  of  the 




































Chapter 2  




A gradual buildup of electrical potential over motor areas precedes self-initiated movements. 
Classical interpretations of such ‘readiness potentials’ (RP) as biomarkers of a specific 
cognitive process of volition have been challenged by new models showing that RPs could 
simply reflect stochastic fluctuations in neural activity. Importantly, these models make 
contrasting predictions about the variability of neural activity during the premovement period. 
Participants waited for an unpredictably occurring dot-motion stimulus, and were rewarded 
for correct left-right manual responses to motion direction. They could alternatively decide to 
skip waiting, by making a bilateral keypress. The bilateral skip response thus reflects a 
purely endogenous decision to act, without any external trigger. In control blocks, the 
bilateral skip response was triggered by an unpredictable change in colour of the fixation 
point. We investigated whether scalp electrophysiological signals prior to action reflected a 
specific precursor process leading to voluntary action, or stochastic motor noise by analysing 
trial-to-trial variability of EEG prior to skip actions. Variability decreased prior to action in both 
conditions, because EEG epochs were action-locked. However, the decrease in variability 
became more marked for self-initiated compared to externally-triggered skip actions, 
beginning from 1.5 s prior to action. This convergence towards a fixed pattern suggests a 
preparatory process prior to self-initiated actions, while remaining entirely consistent with the 
possibility that preparation itself is triggered by random fluctuations. Indeed, computational 
modelling could account for the observed convergence of EEG by adding an additional linear 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































clear operational definition of volition, and an analysis of distribution across individual trials of 
pre-movement EEGs. 



































































































































Changing the experience of a voluntary action 
 
 
The experience of agency could be a reconstructive inference triggered by monitoring one’s 
actions and their outcomes, or a read-out of brain processes related to action preparation, or 
some hybrid of these. Participants pressed a key with the right index finger at a time of their 
own choice, while viewing a rotating clock. Occasionally they received a mild shock on the 
same finger. They were instructed to press the key as quickly as possible if they felt a shock. 
On some trials, trains of subliminal shocks were also delivered, to investigate whether such 
subliminal cues could influence the initiation of voluntary actions, or the subjective 
experience of such actions. Participants’ keypress were always followed by a tone 250ms 
later. At the end of each trial they reported the time of the keypress using the rotating clock 
display. Shifts in the perceived time of the action towards the following tone, compared to a 
baseline condition containing only a keypress but no tone, were taken as implicit measures 
of sense of agency. The subliminal shock train enhanced this “action binding” effect in 
healthy participants, relative to trials without such shocks. This difference could not be 
attributed to retrospective inference, since the perceptual events were identical in both 
conditions. Further, we tested the same paradigm in a patient with anarchic hand syndrome. 
Subliminal shocks again enhanced our measure of sense of agency in the unaffected hand, 
but had a reversed effect on the ‘anarchic’ hand. These findings suggest an interaction 
between internal volitional signals and external cues afforded by the external environment. 
Damage to the neural pathways that mediate interactions between internal states and the 









































































































TP  is  a  54  year  old,  right  handed  woman.  She  is  a  former  secretary  with  11  years  of 
education. Twenty-three months before the testing session, she had a ruptured aneurysm of 
the right anterior cerebral artery, resulting in subarachnoid haemorrhage, involving the genu 
and  trunk  of  the  corpus  callosum.  After  embolization,  she  had  a  vasospasm  of  the  right 
middle cerebral artery. The most recent MRI (14 months before the testing session) showed 
damage  in  the corpus callosum (genu, body and splenium) and  in  the  right anterior  frontal 






Figure 3.1. MRI scans of the patient TP  in sagittal  (A) and horizontal  (B) view. C. Patient’s 
lesion  reconstruction. Mapping of  the brain  lesions was performed by MRIcro  (Rorden and 
Brett,  2000).  Lesions,  as  documented  by  the  most  recent  MRI,  were  traced  on  the  T1-





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Transcranial direct current stimulation over left 
angular gyrus decreases the perceptual association 
between actions and outcomes 
 
 
We performed three experiments using transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) to 
modulate brain circuits involved in control of action, while measuring stimulation-induced 
changes in one implicit measure of sense of agency, namely the perceived temporal 
relationship between a voluntary action and tone triggered by the action. Participants 
perceived such tones as shifted towards the action that caused them, relative to baseline 
conditions with tones but no actions. Actions that caused tones were perceived as shifted 
towards the tone, relative to baseline actions without tones. This ‘intentional binding’ was 
diminished by anodal stimulation of the left parietal cortex (targeting the angular gyrus (AG)), 
and, to a lesser extent, by stimulation targeting the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC), (Experiment 1). Cathodal AG stimulation had no effect (Experiment 2). Experiment 
3 replicated the effect of left anodal AG stimulation for actions made with either the left or the 
right hand, and showed no effect of right anodal AG stimulation. The angular gyrus has been 
identified as a key area for explicit agency judgements in previous neuroimaging and lesion 
studies. Our study provides new causal evidence that the left angular gyrus plays a key role 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter 5.  
Endogenous action selection processes in dorsolateral 




Given the role of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) in action selection, we predicted that 
DLPFC may contribute to sense of agency when participants select between multiple 
actions. Ee performed a series of experiments, manipulating a range of task parameters 
related to action selection and action outcomes, while participants were exposed to tDCS 
stimulation of the left DLPFC. We measured the temporal association between a voluntary 
action and its outcome using the intentional binding effect, as an implicit measure of sense 
of agency. Fixed-effect meta-analysis of our primary data showed a trend towards a frontal 
tDCS, together with considerable heterogeneity between our experiments. Classifying the 
experiments into subsets of studies, according to whether participants endogenously 
selected between alternative actions or not, explained 71% of this heterogeneity. Anodal 
stimulation of DLPFC increased the temporal binding of actions towards tones in the subset 
of studies involving endogenous action selection, but not in the other studies. DLPFC may 
contribute to sense of agency when participants selected between multiple actions. This 
enhanced feeling of control over voluntary actions could be related to the observed 











































































































































































































































































































































































I2 = 44% (moderate heterogeneity) 








Is there a convincing subset of 
studies where an effect is present? 




I2Between= 71% (high heterogeneity) 






























































































































































































































Chapter 6  
Associative mechanisms underlying experiences of 
voluntary and involuntary actions 
 
 
It remains unclear whether sense of agency is hardwired, arising from specific signals within 
the brain’s motor systems, or rather depends on associative learning, through repeated co-
occurrence of voluntary movements and their outcomes. To distinguish these two models, 
we asked participants to trigger a tone by a voluntary keypress action. The voluntary action 
was always associated with an involuntary movement of the other hand. We then tested 
whether the combination of the involuntary movement and tone alone might now suffice to 
produce a sense of agency, even when the voluntary action was omitted. Sense of agency 
was measured using an implicit marker based on time perception, namely a shift in the 
perceived time of the outcome towards the action that caused it. Across two experiments, 
repeatedly pairing an involuntary movement with a voluntary action induced key temporal 
features of agency, with the outcome now perceived as shifted towards the involuntary 
movement. This shift required involuntary movements to have been previously associated 
with voluntary actions. We show that some key aspects of agency may be transferred from 
voluntary actions to involuntary movements. An internal volitional signal is required for the 
primary acquisition of agency, but, with repeated association, the involuntary movement in 
itself comes to produce some key temporal features of agency over the subsequent 
outcome. This finding may explain how humans can develop an enduring sense of agency in 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1  11.76  12.09  6.82  6.79 
2  5.38  5.76  2.27  2.30 
3  6.14  6.45  4.58  4.61 
4  7.16  7.45  3.25  3.22 
5  8.25  8.39  4.57  3.97 
6  7.21  7.70  3.22  3.27 
7  5.92  6.20  1.66  1.67 
8  7.83  8.16  3.20  3.23 
9  6.08  6.48  1.26  1.20 
10  6.32  6.54  2.96  2.68 
11  5.34  5.85  1.00  1.01 
12  6.89  7.28  2.72  2.70 
13  4.83  5.23  1.83  1.82 
14  8.06  8.23  2.66  2.54 
15  8.97  9.44  3.60  3.60 
16  9.25  9.66  5.85  5.91 
17  6.30  6.81  2.69  2.61 
18  7.72  8.14  2.53  2.57 
19  6.90  7.16  2.94  2.93 
20  7.32  7.80  2.40  2.62 
21  9.44  9.85  2.93  2.94 
































































1  0.43  0.42  0.55  0.92 
2  0.37  0.36  0.47  1.44 
3  0.46  0.45  0.59  1.12 
4  0.54  0.53  0.69  0.68 
5  0.26  0.25  0.33  0.68 
6  0.43  0.42  0.55  1.12 
7  0.41  0.40  0.52  1.29 
8  0.47  0.46  0.60  1.12 
9  0.33  0.32  0.42  1.12 
10  0.70  0.69  0.90  0.61 
11  0.53  0.52  0.68  0.68 
12  0.44  0.43  0.56  1.29 
13  0.70  0.69  0.90  0.68 
14  0.35  0.34  0.44  1.12 
15  0.37  0.36  0.47  1.44 
16  0.48  0.47  0.61  0.92 
17  0.55  0.54  0.70  0.92 
18  0.57  0.56  0.73  1.12 
19  0.41  0.40  0.52  1.12 
20  0.72  0.71  0.92  0.97 
21  0.48  0.47  0.61  1.12 
22  1.13  1.12  1.46  1.12 













































































































1  124  37  3  170 
2  284  19  124  -80 
3  124  137  76  39 
4  64  229  70  -117 
5  305  250  -49  51 
6  132  271  126  158 
7  113  -24  44  116 
8  27  203  89  -87 
9  -45  64  1  269 
10  -29  174  31  -21 
11  124  55  -274  -18 
12  63  -28  86  131 
13  -53  162  38  44 
14  147  50  -443  276 
15  -142  -3  67  116 
16  -19  -72  -437  48 
17  45  170  0  -10 
18  301  130  17  167 
19  14  -33  118  62 
20  97  159  -595  56 
21  25  108  -90  -188 
22  81  -37  -101  178 
23  141  -61  -25  95 
24  -90  -37  45  -65 
25  396  -128    -61 
26  401  219    -111 
27  -38  -22    -118 
28  20  -196    15 
29  148  -103    13 
30  147      95 
31  92      -22 
32  271      -66 
33  31       
34  94       
35  67       
36  40       
37  195       
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